Nkandla and Affirmative Action by Kowalenko, Robert
Nkandla and affirmative action
BY ROBERT KOWALENKO
[published in Business Day (South Africa), March 5 2015, page 13, Opinion & 
Analysis Section]
IMAGINE your neighbour plans to have his driveway paved while he and his 
family are on holiday. He pays a construction company in advance, and leaves 
behind a set of instructions on how to do the job, including an address and 
description of his driveway.
Imagine, also, that he has an enemy who gets wind of this and decides to play a 
mischievous  trick  on  him:  she  finds  and  replaces  his  instructions  with  a 
description of your driveway, which is right next to his. Imagine, finally, that 
you also go away on holiday and your neighbour returns to find your driveway 
has been paved instead of his.
This is how political and moral philosopher Robert K Fullinwider in his book, 
The  Reverse  Discrimination  Controversy,  illustrates  the  complexities  of  so-
called compensatory justice.
Your neighbour has suffered financial harm through no fault of his own, and is 
entitled to compensation or reparation of some sort. Evidently the culprit is his 
enemy, she should pay. But what if her identity remains unknown? In these 
circumstances, are you under a moral obligation to pay compensation, or to 
help undo the wrong?
You would  be  unlikely  to  protest  if  it  were  possible  to  magically  strip  the 
surface from your driveway and move it to your neighbour’s without changing 
your driveway from its previous condition — leaving you no better or worse 
off than before the harm was inflicted, while restoring to your neighbour the 
benefit to which he is entitled.
But stripping a driveway costs money, and it is not possible to return it to its 
previous condition without another resurfacing. The reality is,  compensating 
your neighbour would leave you worse off.
Some argue that,  nevertheless,  you are morally obliged to pay because you 
have benefited from harm done to someone else without being entitled to this 
benefit.  They  invoke  the  intuitively  plausible  moral  principle  that  "he  who 
benefits from a wrong must help pay for the wrong".
Mr Fullinwider, however, objects: this would be tantamount to pretending that 
there is no moral difference at all between you and your neighbour’s enemy. 
Yet, the enemy, through her immoral actions, gave up her right not to suffer the 
harm necessary to compensate your neighbour; you, on the contrary, had no 
choice in the matter — you didn’t know, and had no means of avoiding the 
benefit accrued.
You  therefore  have  the  right  not  to  be  harmed  for  the  purpose  of  your 
neighbour’s compensation. Mr Fullinwider proposes a new principle: only "he 
who knowingly and willingly benefits  from a wrong must  help pay for  the 
wrong".
I  cannot  help  but  wonder  whether  President  Jacob  Zuma  and/or  the  top 
echelons of the African National Congress (ANC) recently had the pleasure of 
reading Mr Fullinwider. It certainly appears so.
For Zuma’s response — and that  of  several  government agencies — to the 
demand  by  the  public  protector  and  the  opposition  that  he  must 
#paybackthemoney, because he "unduly benefited" from the spending on his 
private homestead at Nkandla, is premised on the claim that he didn’t know 
about it and therefore had no way of avoiding the benefit accrued to him. Why 
should he pay back the money if he didn’t personally order the spending?
Despite attempts to mitigate the effect on public opinion of some of the specific 
disclosures — by insisting, for instance, that the construction of the swimming 
pool, cattle kraal and chicken run all had security rationales — none of the 
official government reports on Nkandla try to deny the undeniable: R246m for 
security upgrades at the president’s private home is exorbitant, public money 
has obviously been misappropriated and misspent and, consequently, a wrong 
has occurred.
... 
For  example,  the  ministerial  task  team’s  report  of  2013  notes  large  cost 
overruns, high consultancy fees, and prima facie evidence that supply chain 
management rules were disregarded, all of which points to the "possibility" of 
overpricing and collusion.
The report of Parliament’s joint standing committee on intelligence (on the task 
team report)  speaks  of  "high  costs"  and  recommends  that  the  allocation  of 
tenders and appointment of contractors should be probed by the auditor-general 
in order to detect any "abuse" or "unlawful conduct".
The Special Investigating Unit (SIU) argues that the scale of construction at Mr 
Zuma’s  residence  in  certain  cases  far  exceeded  security  requirements,  and 
amounted to "indefensible extravagance". Its report is the most specific of all, 
putting the loss to the public purse at R155,324,516.49.
Mr Zuma finally, after considering the intelligence committee and SIU reports 
in  his  report  to  Parliament  in  August  last  year,  admits  "whilst  a  legislative 
framework exists, it was either deficient in certain respects, wholly ignored or 
miss-applied (sic)".
There’s hardly any disagreement, then, that a wrong has been committed, one 
from  which  the  president  materially  benefited.  Public  Protector  Thuli 
Madonsela’s report is the clearest on this (the president "benefited unduly"), 
and the SIU concurs — at least insofar as through the illicit increase of the 
scope  of  the  works  undertaken,  "the  value  of  the  president’s  residential 
complex was enhanced (and) the president or his family were enriched".
The joint standing committee on intelligence task team report and Parliament’s 
ad hoc report on Nkandla do not explicitly contest this assessment.
What all the state institutions do contest is that the benefit was intentionally and 
willingly obtained on Mr Zuma’s part. This insistence makes the analogy with 
Mr Fullinwider’s driveway example complete.
"Attempts to lay the responsibility for the upgrade at the door of the president 
are misdirected and malicious," says the Department of Public Works, which 
has accepted responsibility. The Parliament ad hoc committee adds that "it is 
clear  that  the  president  did  not  request  the  upgrades"  and that  there  is  "no 
evidence that the president in any manner influenced" the executive authorities 
performing them.
The  SIU  in  large  part  blames  Mr  Zuma’s  personal  architect,  Minenhle 
Makhanya (declaring him, in essence, to be the "enemy" in Mr Fullinwider’s 
analogy); and Mr Zuma says, in his parliamentary answer, that he did not know 
how  much  various  components  of  the  upgrade  had  cost  and  adds  in  an 
interview that "he did not take a penny" of taxpayers’ money.
Mr Zuma, although he has benefited from the wrong committed at Nkandla, is 
not  liable  to  help  compensate  the  public  purse,  because  he  did  not  do  so 
knowingly and willingly, and had no way of avoiding it.
... 
So, what's   wrong with using the Fullinwider argument in this way? Let’s put 
the  factual  question  of  how much Zuma knew and whether  he  could  have 
avoided the spending aside, and suppose the ANC’s defence is true. Here’s the 
rub: Mr Fullinwider uses the principle he derives from his driveway example to 
argue  against  the  preferential  hiring  of  black candidates  over  whites  in  the 
context of affirmative action policies.
We must not ask, he says, whether a white candidate benefited from wrongs 
done to blacks in the past, and can therefore ethically be obliged to make up for 
those wrongs by ceding this job, scholarship, or place at university, to a black 
competitor. We must rather ask whether the white candidate deliberately took 
advantage of these benefits, or refused to avoid them. If she did not, then, even 
though she is not entitled to these benefits,  we have no justification to take 
away her right to equal consideration and to harm her — just as we have no 
justification  to  harm  you  in  order  to  compensate  your  neighbour  for  his 
misfortune.
The ANC, despite its manifest use of the Fullinwider principle in defence of Mr 
Zuma, would probably not want to follow him in this argument. Affirmative 
action and black economic empowerment (BEE) are morally justified on the 
ANC’s political platform.
Yet,  if  the  ANC  objects  to  the  driveway  argument  and  to  the  Fullinwider 
principle on the grounds it can be used to argue against BEE, then it cannot, 
without inconsistency, use this principle to justify Mr Zuma’s refusal to pay for 
Nkandla.
If, on the other hand, it does not object to the driveway argument, then it needs 
to  show why  affirmative  action  is  justified  despite  the  argument’s  validity. 
Consistency is not merely a logician’s fetish: public representatives who justify 
one action with a moral principle, but refuse to apply the principle to another 
action, lose moral, political, and intellectual credibility. If they do not object to 
the driveway argument, they need to show why affirmative action is justified 
despite its validity.
In any case, the ANC has some intellectual work to do. Is there anyone left, 
after Pallo Jordan has deserted public discourse, who can do it?
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